No. 358

FROM: Hsinking

TO: Shanghai, Nanking, Peking

April 28, 1941

# 74.

Circular. Message to Tokyo as # 231.

(Part 1 of 2) [a].

Accompanying the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality agreement, the most important question is whether there is going to be any material change in the Soviet and the Comintern's Manchukuoan political machinations. Hereinafter, follow statistics on the arrest of Soviet spies and saboteurs in Manchukuo, as well as Manchukuoan nationals who illegally entered the Soviet, covering a period from January of last year to March of this year.

a. Persons arrested for illegal entry of the Soviet:

Tofkokka [b] Province—242 (of these, 126 were members of the Chinese Communist Guerrilla Society).

Toan [b] Province—449 (of these 396 were members of the Chinese Communist Guerrilla Society).

Msko [b] Province—92 (of these 43 were members of the Chinese Communist Guerrilla Society).

Hsing An Peh [c] Province—30 (none of these were members of the Chinese Communist Guerrilla Society).

Ewantung [d] Province—24 (of these all were members of the Chinese Communist Guerrilla Society).

Botanko [b] Province—30 (all of these were members of the Chinese Communist Guerrilla Society).

This makes a total of 868, of which 519 were members of the Chinese (Communist Guerrilla Society. A portion of these members of the Chinese Communist Guerrilla Society apprehended entering the Soviet can be tabulated as follows:

36 were members of the Manchukuoan Army

45 were members of the Manchukuoan Police Organization

78 were kurii [b]

53 were ----

Page A-186

This same figure --—- 519 ----- broken down by national differences, is as follows:

175 were Manchukuoan subjects

24 were Chinese

4 were White Russian

2 were Japanese

1 was Mongolian

Of these, 170 were discovered to be clearly hand-in-glove with the Soviet in their operations principally with the Military Police. The greater portion of those apprehended entering Russia would, after receiving instructions from the Soviet authorities, be broken down into two groups—spies and saboteurs; others, it seems, would be marked for further instruction. Still others, members of the Chinese Communist Guerrilla Society, would be given instructions in the Soviet and then freshly armed would be sent into Manchukuo. Now, the thing that we must most carefully pay heed to is this serious tendency of armed and organized saboteurs which seems to be gaining considerable strength.

[a] (Part 2 of 2) Hsinking reports on the roundup of Soviet spies and instigators in Manchukuo from January to December of last year. See I, 359.

[b] Kana spelling.

[c] In northern Manchukuo.

[d] In southern Manchukuo.

Trans. Not dated

No. 359

FROM: Hsinking

TO: Shanghai, Nanking, Peking

April 28, 1941

# 74.

Circular. Message to Tokyo as # 231.

(Part 2 of 2) [a].

b. The Roundup of Soviet Spies.

From January to December of last year in Manchukuo 327 Soviet spies were rounded up, principally for having made illegal ----- ----- and after receiving instructions, made entry into Manchukuo. The object of their investigations was to look into the state of military affairs and communication systems, but especially to acquire spies. They were instructed to pay close attention to recent trends and to arm and equip spies with the view of scheming to steal secret documents. These operators looked to Soviet border police authorities for instructions.

c. The Roundup of Soviet Instigators.

From January to December of last year in Manchukuo and the Kwantung peninsula, 108 instigators were apprehended (no roundups have been made this year) in a total of ten outbreaks engineered by them. Of these, four were graduates of a secret school maintained by the military group in Moscow which is called the Far Eastern Laborers' Communist University (Kuntobee). Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  They directed the corps of operators functioning in Manchukuo. It is understood that they receive their orders from the Internation Plot Organization of the Comintern sectional office in Shanghai.

Should you think it advisable, please transmit this to Berlin, London, Washington, Vladivostok and Hongkong.

Relayed to Russia, Shanghai and Peking.

[a] See I, 358.

Trans. 4-30-41

Page A-187

No. 360

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Moscow

7 May 1941

# 954.

In view of the attitude of the United States, it is urgent to adjust our relations with U.S.S.R. We are doing everything we can at this end toward that goal. We trust you will do likewise at your end.

Trans. 5-9-41

No. 361

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Berlin

7 May 1941

No number.

Action Moscow as # 455.

Please report internal and external circumstances regarding Stalin's assumption of Chairmanship of the Council of Peoples Commissar, and possible effects and opinions regarding same.

Trans. 5-8-41

No. 362

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Washington (Koshi)

7 May 1941

No number.

Received from Moscow as # 549.

Stalin's assumption of Chairmanship of Council of People's Commissar, and Molotov's appointment to Vice-Premiership and Commissar of Foreign Affairs, no doubt, will have a far-reaching effect in view of the times. The following is our general evaluation of the above situation:

In view of the present complicated world situation, Stalin has decided to assume the leadership in politics and internal affairs, and to let Molotov assume the full direction of foreign policy. In foreign affairs, it probably can be said that Stalin, profiting by the example of German and Italian dictators, intends personally to participate in direct dealings with foreign powers, whenever necessary.

As regards internal affairs, despite his assumption of Premiership, Stalin will no doubt retain his position as the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, thus achieving the vast leadership, for the first time, since it was held by Lenin. Furthermore, considering the fact that in the past the Premiership has traditionally been held by men from Greater Russia, and that Stalin is a Georgean, it indicates that Stalin has come to feel, after deep deliberation, that the time is ripe for him to participate openly in internal affairs. (His advocacy of the principle of Greater Russianism and Greater Russian language, since the beginning of the present European War, can be considered as long-range, deeply laid preparatory plan for the present assumption of power).

On the other hand, the delegation of full direction of foreign policy to Molotov may certainly be attributed to present complex European situations, at the same time it may be Stalin's scheme, in view of the recent trend in German-Soviet relations, to make Molotov solely responsible for its future developments, so that should a hitch develop in the German-Soviet relations,

Page A-188

Stalin may dispose of Molotov with dispatch. Even if we accept this assumption for whatever it is worth, it appears from the fact that he had been demoted to vice-premiership, and that his wife was recently severely criticized at the party conference, that Molotov's star is declining, and already we hear the name of WISINSUKI mentioned as successor to Molotov.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 363

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Berlin

7 May 1941

# 378.

Regarding my message to Moscow # 455 [a].

Please obtain Ribbentrop's opinion on this matter. Relayed to Moscow.

[a] See I, 361. Re Stalin's assumption of Chairmanship of the Council of Peoples Commissar.

Trans. 5-8-41

No. 364

FROM: Berlin

TO: Tokyo

9 May 1941

# 510.

On the occasion of my conversations which I reported to you in my message # 506 [a], I said that it is generally believed that preparations being made by Germany for war with the U.S.S.R. was for the purpose of showing the U.S.S.R. the military might of Germany, with which Germany expected to get some concessions. I added that I would like to hear his opinion on the matter.

He replied that at present no one could predict whether or not matters would develop so far as to bring about a German-U.S.S.R. war. However, he could say that Germany was not engaged in any demonstrated bluff.

I, therefore, said that I hoped he would let me know in advance if Germany decides to fight Russia. I assured him that we would guard the secret very strictly.

(I have related this matter to both the military and naval attaché).

[a] Not available.

Trans. 5-26-41

No. 365

FROM: Berlin (Oshima)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

9 May 1941

# 507.

Stalin's assumption of the Chairmanship of the Council of Peoples' Commissar, is for the existing emergency. Stalin's holding the three branches of the government, political, military, and internal, is, as is generally observed, for the purpose of demonstrating the functions in view of the political conditions at the present. However, the reason for this having taken place suddenly at this time is no doubt due to international complications in general and to Soviet

Page A-189

German relations in particular. If we assume for instance that Germany is about to make the greatest demands on the Soviet since the outbreak of the war, due to necessity, it is quite probable that Russia may be forced to make some great concession to Germany then it may have been necessary for Stalin to have established his leadership in name as well as in fact in order that he might better control the internal situation. However we view it, the Soviet has made preparations for an important turning point in their policy.

Trans. 5-16-41

No. 366

FROM: Berlin (Osima)

TO: Tokyo

April 16, 1941

# 418.

Part 1 of 4.

Re my # 413 [a].

There follow the results of a conference between Vice Admiral NOMURA, the military and naval attaches and myself. I humbly submit the following views:

1. It would seem that, depending upon how the Soviet acts, Germany is planning to attack her, or that some hitch has occurred in Germany's battle against Britain. It would seem that perhaps Germany is planning first to defeat the Soviet, secure the rich stores of Russian raw materials and, thus having fortified herself, to attack England later. As I have wired you from time to time, Germany had completed all her submarine, raiding and invasion plans to overthrow England. Vice Admiral NOMURA and the naval officers under him confirm that all preparations had been made for the war in the west. Looking at the matter without bias, it would seem that Germany is considering such matters as assistance from the United States to England and probably considers that this will be a hindrance to her success. It would seem that perhaps Germany is losing confidence in the possibility of defeating the British Isles, or that perhaps she fears that the war would drag out too long to her disadvantage, and that finally she might never get a chance to give the Soviet the blow she desires to deliver. In any case, German-Soviet relations have suddenly cooled. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire During Germany's Balkan endeavors the Soviet did all she could to thwart the Reich, and Germany is losing all confidence in the Soviet's good faith. This is clear from the statements of Chancellor HITLER and those near him.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 4-29-41