(Part 3 of 4)

(To be handled in government code.)  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Judging by the impression I got from the above mentioned facts and my contacts with them so far, they figure on first bringing about unanimity on the fundamental questions on which our two countries have so far failed to see eye to eye, and then gradually to turn to the other matters. They evidently feel that so long as there is disagreement on the aforementioned points it would be vain and futile to discuss the various other problems, therefore, up to now the United States has done no more than express her opinions on the other matters in the proposal of June 11.  http://41002louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com (As I have wired you, some changes were made in the last clause.)

In their proposal of June 21, they made it evident that they were going to stick to this as the basis for negotiations. The latest reply of theirs shows, I am sure, that they are entirely disregarding our own proposal of the 25th. This shows that they are going to stick to their ideas as they stand; however, it will still be necessary for us to talk through certain matters concerning, A. The matter mentioned in the annex of the clause concerning the China incident. B. http://41002louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com Discontinuing activities designed to help CHIANG. C. The stipulation concerning Nanking Treaty in the clause concerning the China incident (an agreement between Japan and China): joint mediation and the right of self-protection mentioned in the clause concerning our attitude toward the European war; the question of eliminating the annex to the clause concerning commerce between the two nations.)

Trans. 10-10-41

[A-145]

(Part 4 of 4)

-----------------------------------------------------------------. Concerning the four principles mentioned in (2) during the conversation mentioned in your #634[a], the American Ambassador talked as if I had already reached an understanding with Secretary HULL on this. As I have told you in various messages, they shelved the question in both letter and spirit, but on April 16 when Secretary HULL presented me with these four points (see my #277[b]), I certainly was in no position to accept such a proposal before getting instructions from my home government, nor would I give the impression that we would accept them. Please note that. Nevertheless, these are very abstract principles, and I figured that there would be some elasticity in their application. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  This country applied them with prudence to other foreign nations; for example, in peace conferences, discussions of principles are extremely circumlocutionary, so I do not think you need to be troubled over this.

[a] The number is apparently wrong, as the subject matter of this message mentioned is unrelated.
[b] See Vol. I, April 16 in which NOMURA gives his views on the attitude and policies of the United States Government, and the four basic points which the United States advocates.

Trans. 10-10-41

Re your #637[a].

This morning, the 9th, I called on Hull and relayed the matter contained in your instructions, and at the same time brought up the points discussed at the White House on 3 September. The Secretary, in reply, merely repeated that non-discriminatory treatment should extend over the entire Pacific area. He added that geographical proximity, etc. could be interpreted in many ways. He said that he would have Ballantine and others make a detailed reply to me later after the papers I submitted were carefully perused and studied. (Hamilton and Ballantine are supposed to call on me this afternoon).

Referring to the matter of evacuating or stationing of troops in China, I carefully and in detail described the political situation in China from the Japanese viewpoint and pointed out that stationing of our troops in certain parts of China was absolutely essential. I requested that this point be given a reconsideration in this light.

I also stated that the Prime Minister had stated that he was in accord with the "Four Principles" in principle only, but Hull indicated that he was already aware of this fact.

[a] See III, 245—Re the U.S. note of 2 October it is assumed there is agreement with the U.S. on all points of the negotiations for an "Understanding Agreement", except evacuation from China, and the Tripartite Pact. Is that true? Konoye approves in principle the Four Principles laid down by the U.S. and expected to iron out their application in conference.

Trans. 10-13-41

[A-146]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(In 2 parts—complete)
(For official code handling. Secret outside of department.)
Re my #915[a].

On the 9th, Hamilton (accompanied by Ballantine and Schmidt) called on me on instructions of the Secretary of State, and I tried, on the basis of your #637[b] and along the general lines of your telephone conversation, to ascertain their intentions. They went into minute explanations pointing out that the U.S. Government's attitude is made plain in the memorandum of October 2nd, namely that this government is seeking to promote peace in the Pacific on the basis of the so-called Four Principles, and that the views of the United States in regard to such problems as Japan's forced advances northward and southward, indiscriminatory treatment in the Pacific, withdrawal of troops in China, and the Tripartite Treaty, have their origin in a fundamental concern with regard to the future. They stated that these principles apply to the entire Pacific area, and that there is no reason for applying different principles in the various areas of the Pacific. In reply to my question as to whether or not the United States is satisfied with our explanation in regard to all other points aside from those pointed out in the memorandum of the 2nd, they replied that they would like to have this ascertained from the basic attitude of the U.S. Government which is indicated in the memorandum of the 2nd, that this memorandum was given careful study by the U.S. Government and that this represents all that the U.S. Government has to say and that therefore there is nothing more for them to add. They emphasized the fact that they think that the U.S. Government does not now desire to enter upon any more discussions in regard to details, and that if there is a "meeting of minds" between the two nations in regard to the interpretation of the four basic principles, the other questions will find a natural understanding; but they avoided giving much in the way of definite replies to my questions.

Of course, they did state that there might be points in the proposal of June 21st which would need revision because of subsequent changes in the situation, but that in its larger aspects there has been no change and added further that after having studied these four basic principles, if Japan should reconsider the September 6th proposal and submit a second proposal, the United States stands ready to give it careful consideration.

With the situation as thus stated, I think we might as well proceed on the assumptions mentioned in my #907[a].

[a] See III, 258.
[b] See III, 245—Re the U.S. note of 2 October, it is assumed there is agreement with the U.S. on all points of the negotiations for an "Understanding Agreement", except evacuation from China, and the Tripartite Pact. Is that true? Konoye approves in principle the Four Principles laid down by the U.S. and expected to iron out their application in conference.
[c] See III, 254-257—In reply to Tokyo query whether the U.S. agrees to all points except "evacuation from China", Nomura explains in detail his ideas of the U.S. position and reasons for refusing the leader's meeting. Japan has equivocated and limited her agreement to the Four Principles the U.S. insist must be the basis of an understanding.

Trans. 10-14-41

[A-147]

Re your #915[a].

1. Slowly but surely the question of these negotiations has reached the decisive stage. I am doing my utmost to bring about a decision on them and the situation does not permit of this senseless procrastination. The difficult points must be clarified now. My #637[b] and related messages were sent you for that reason. What I wish of you now is to find out as soon as possible the opinions of the United States concerning the matters mentioned in those messages. (Otherwise, as I have told you two or three times, it will be impossible for me to decide upon our policy.) Yes, I know you have told me your opinions quite sufficiently in a number of messages, but what I want is the opinions of the American officials and none other.

2. In your caption message you do not tell me whether or not we have a chance to proceed with these parleys. You do not tell me how HULL answers. You do not tell me anything else I need to know for my future consideration. You must wire me in detail and immediately the minutes of these conversations, what they say and the prospect for negotiations. Hereafter, when you interview HULL or the President of the United States, please take WAKASUGI or IGUCHI with you and please send me without any delay the complete minutes of what transpires.  http://41002louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com

[a] See III, 258.
[b] See III, 245 in which Foreign Minister TOYODA asks Ambassador Nomura to clarify immediately with the United States Government two points.

Trans. 10-13-41  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

I have read your #650[a].

What they want is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific and they claim that our policy is semi-pacific and semi-aggressive. They say that our proposal of September 6 diverged greatly from preceding statements, and that it will be out of the question to agree on any preparatory talks on the basis of such a proposal. In addition, to the three matters mentioned in your message, it seems that there are many other objections. I have repeatedly asked them to clarify what I do not understand, but they won't answer. At any rate, however, I feel safe at least in saying that they are demanding that we compromise in accordance with the lines laid down in their memorandum of October 2. I am sure that there is not the slightest chance on earth of them featuring a conference of leaders so long as we do not make that compromise. http://41002louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In other words, they are not budging an inch from the attitude they have always taken; however, they act as if they were ready to consider at any time any plan of ours which would meet the specifications of their answer of the 2nd.

I think that you fully realize the situation I described in my #917[b] yesterday. However, I am sending you this for your information.

[a] See III, 260.
[b] See III, 259.

Trans. 10-11-41

On the afternoon of the 10th I asked Minister GREW to call on me. For your private information I spoke to him as follows, and as I have asked you before, I want you to continue your efforts to lead the United States officials to present us with a clearcut proposal:

1. "On the 3rd we received the American memorandum of the 2nd and have given it most cordial consideration. It is a little difficult for us to grasp the important points of it, but as best we can make out, they are (1) garrisoning and evacuating soldiers; (2) the English, Japanese, American attitude toward the European war; and (3) non-discrimination in commerce in China.

2. "Now we wish to put all our cards on the table and to proceed with negotiations. If the United States has any misgivings on those three points, or on any others, I am sure it will be possible for us to straighten them out. I would like to present to the treaty officials a proposal having some possibilities of adoption. Concerning those three points there is also a question of time. There is no use in exchanging official letters, notes and other documents as we now are. If we would only start out with a conference of leaders, such difficulties as exist may fade away automatically."

3. The American Ambassador said "The United States is a free country and we have to carefully consider public opinion." I retorted "Well, it is none the less so with us. It is true that we are under the thumb of public opinion, but if we can agree with the United States on a conference, public opinion will, of itself, calm down and no such unrest as now exists will continue. If we go on this way, it will be hard to say what the extremists may do."

4. I passed on to the Army Your Honor's communication concerning French Indo-China, but so far I have received no reply. I expect it soon.

Trans. 10-15-41

[A-149]

From Wakasugi to the Foreign Office.

At 5 p.m. the 13th I am scheduled to confer with Under Secretary Welles, during which I plan to ascertain in detail the attitude of their side.  http://41002louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com  Welles also has expressed a desire to have a long chat with me at that time. This much for the time being.

Chief of office routing.

Please convey this to the Foreign Minister also.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Trans. 10-15-41

Re your #924[a].

We shall cable our instructions with regard to the talks referred to, subsequently. Please be so advised.

[a] See III, 263.

Trans. 10-13-41

Re my #657[a].

I presume that your talks with Welles will cover the U.S.-Japanese negotiations in toto. We are particularly anxious to be advised as soon as possible, as I have mentioned in previous messages referring to this subject, on the points listed below. (The situation at home is fast approaching a crisis and it is becoming absolutely essential that the two leaders meet if any adjustment of Japanese-U.S. relations is to be accomplished. I cannot go into details now, but please bear this fact in mind.)

1. May we assume that the United States has no particular disagreements other than the three points which are under consideration at the present time?

2. Submitting by the United States a counter proposal to our proposal of 25 September. (As you are well aware, our proposal of 25 September embodied our claims in the form submitted by the United States as their proposal on 21 June. Should the United States be reluctant to

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  http://41002louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com

submit a clear-cut counter proposal to ours referred to above, we should request that they submit a basically new proposal immediately.)

Of point 1 set forth above, we are particularly interested in being advised of what the United States exactly desires concerning the matter of evacuation or garrisoning of troops.

[a] See III, 264—"We shall cable our instructions with regard to the talks referred to, subsequently. Please be so advised.

Trans. 10-13-41

Re my #658[a].

I pointed out in my message referred to in the heading that circumstances do not permit even an instant's delay. Please, therefore, submit a report on the rough outline and the general tone of the conference between Wakasugi and Welles immediately, and dispatch a cable giving the details, subsequently.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[a] See III, 265.

Trans. 10-14-41